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Abstract 
The reluctance of children to revise their prior beliefs is a prominent phenomenon in the 
reasoning literature. One way to facilitate belief change is offering explanations, and this 
study examined whether highlighting (counter)evidence with diagrams leads to belief 
revision to the same extent. Altogether 134 preschoolers and second-graders (5- and 7-
year-olds, respectively) were presented with either counterintuitive data or explanations, 
both refuting a strong commonly held belief concerning the relation between two 
variables (e.g. eating carrots improves vision). In the explanation condition, we presented 
children with an explanatory underlying mechanism for the unexpected causal relation 
(e.g. spinach and carrots contain the same amount of vitamin A, with both improving 
vision). In the diagram condition, children were presented with empirical data displayed 
in a bar graph (non-covariation), which also disconfirmed the initial belief. In both age 
groups and both conditions we found significant numbers of belief revision with high 
certainty ratings concerning the new belief. Belief change was more pronounced in 
second-graders, who in addition showed significantly more changes in the diagram 
condition than in the explanation condition. These findings suggest that the perceptual 
saliency of (counter)evidence helps children to correctly evaluate hypotheses, which 
supports changes in their prior belief.      
Keywords: belief revision, hypothesis evaluation, primary-school children, diagram, 
explanation 
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1. Introduction 
The prominent role of prior knowledge in the evaluation of evidence is a well-documented 
phenomenon in the reasoning literature (e.g., Croker & Buchanan, 2011; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Laughlin, 
1988). Especially when evidence is inconsistent with their favored hypotheses or beliefs, children often 
refuse to update their initial beliefs; rather, they distort their interpretation of the data so that these are in 
accordance with their initially held belief (Klaczynski, 2001; Kuhn et al., 1988). The distortion typically 
entails that children ignore data that are inconsistent with their initial belief, that they selectively attend to 
only those parts of the data that are consistent with their initial belief, or that they even misinterpret the data 
(Amsel & Brock, 1996; Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Kuhn, et al., 1988; Masnick, 
Klahr, & Knowles, 2016).  
A common explanation for this phenomenon has been proposed by Kuhn (e.g., Kuhn, 2010). Kuhn 
suggests that young children do not understand that theory (beliefs) and evidence (data) are two 
epistemologically distinct categories. Specifically, she argues that young children do not understand that 
theories need to be fully backed up by evidence, which would result in their selective interpretation of data. 
In a well-known study, Kuhn and her colleagues (1988) asked children to interpret data that suggested a 
causal relation between a set of variables (e.g., different kinds of food, being healthy or not). Specifically, 
sixth- and ninth graders, as well as adults, were presented with fictitious data that, so were told, was obtained 
in a boarding school, in which different groups of students consumed four different kinds of food or 
beverage (diet coke or regular coke, baked potato or fries, oranges or apples, and Special K or granola). 
Some of the students in the boarding school felt sick after lunch, others were healthy. Two variables 
contradicted the prior belief of the participants and two variables were in accordance with the participants’ 
beliefs concerning the impact of the different food items on the health of the students When children were 
asked whether a specific kind of food caused the students’ sickness, Kuhn and colleagues found that only the 
older children and the adults used evidence-based reasoning (i.e., they related their answer to the covariation 
data). In contrast, most of the younger children did not attend to the evidence at all or they did not interpret it 
correctly and instead they kept their initial belief.    
Although this finding seems to suggest some severe deficits in data interpretation skills and an 
insufficient differentiation between hypothesis and evidence in young children, more recent research shows 
that children as young as six-year olds possess a basic understanding of the hypothesis-evidence relation 
(e.g. Ruffman, Perner, Olson & Doherty, 1993). For instance, Koerber, Sodian, Thoermer, and Nett (2005) 
found that children as young as five-year-olds are able to successfully interpret simple patterns of covariation 
data, without any distortion of prior beliefs, when data are not overly complex and when the prior belief is 
not too strong. In their study, Koerber and colleagues presented children with a hypothesis held by a story 
character and a set of covariation data (perfect and imperfect covariations, noncovariation) that contradicted 
the protagonist’s hypothesis. Most five-year-olds successfully attributed a belief revision to the protagonist 
when the relation presented in the data was straightforward (perfect covariation), showing that they are able 
to successfully interpret simple patterns of data without any distortions and to incorporate this new evidence 
into their theories (see also Piekny & Maehler, 2013; van der Graaf, Segers, & Verhoeven, 2016, for a 
replication of these findings). These confirmatory findings of early data interpretation skills are in line with a 
growing literature on early preschool and primary school scientific thinking, which shows that already young 
children possess a basic understanding of the distinction between hypothesis and evidence (Mayer, Koerber, 
Sodian & Schwippert, 2014; Sandoval, Sodian, Koerber, & Wong, 2014). The discovery of increasingly 
mature scientific thinking skills in this young age group suggests that children, in principle, should be able to 
use data and evidence to update and revise their initially held beliefs.     
But then why do studies find such weak performance in belief revision tasks in young children? We 
argue that one of the main reasons why evidence evaluation often fails to promote belief revision in young 
children is that many studies use evidence that is either too complex and/or is not salient enough, especially 
so for young children. Asking children to interpret data about the effects of multiple variables in a single 
design, as for instance was done in Kuhn et al. (1988), places heavy demands on children’s general 
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information-processing capacities and it demands a sequential processing of information. In addition the 
information typically only enters via a single perceptual route (i.e., data are presented only verbally without 
graphical depiction). Chinn and Malhotra (2002) found that indeed children find it difficult to make correct, 
undistorted observations of (counter)evidence when the data are not salient. Data with little salience 
increased children’s reluctance to change their prior belief in the face of new evidence, showing that the 
salience of the evidence is an important facilitator of successful belief revision. 
One possible way to increase salience of data lies in the presentation of evidence in simple bar 
graphs. Bar graphs make possible a salient and meaningful representation of covariation data and even 
preschoolers can successfully interpret these graphs (Koerber & Sodian, 2008). Their positive effects are, 
such as those of many well-designed visual displays, mostly attributed to the following three characteristics 
(e.g. Hegarty, 2011; Kosslyn, 1989, 1994, 2006; Larkin & Simon, 1987): First, bar graphs serve as external 
storage for information and thus they reduce memory capacity. Second, the relations between two variables 
are spatially organized in bar graphs and they can be perceived at a glance (i.e., different pieces of 
information and relations between variables can be perceived simultaneously and thus bar graphs allow for a 
more efficient processing of information). And third, complex cognitive processes can be “offloaded” on 
perception in bar graphs. Taken together, bar graphs thus assist information processing by offering an 
additional perceptual route (in addition to the verbal route) and, in addition, their two-dimensional display of 
a relation between two variables allows using analogies to space and spatial relations in order to make 
inferences on non-spatial content domains. Graphs thus offer the viewer information (e.g., a linear trend) in a 
direct way which does not require that this information is inferred or computed from numerical or verbal 
data. Recent research has shown that the positive effects of bar graphs even hold for children as young as 
six-year-olds. Moreover, prior research showed that kindergarteners can successfully read off causal 
relations from simple bar graphs (Koerber & Sodian, 2008).  
The present study investigates whether successful belief revision can be induced in young children 
when evidence is presented in a salient way (i.e., in a bar graph) that requires reduced information 
processing. Specifically, we compare this way of inducing belief revision to a highly effective means of 
revising initially held beliefs, which is providing children with explanations and causal mechanisms that link 
the two variables. This approach has been taken by Koslowski (1996, 2012, see also Koslowski, Marasia, 
Chelenza, & Dublin, 2008), who argues that children often do not give up their initially held beliefs in favor 
of contrary evidence because of their strong subjective causal theories. These causal theories comprise not 
only information about the statistical association (covariation) between two variables, but they also entail 
beliefs about the underlying causal mechanism that connects the two variables. According to this account, 
covariation evidence alone cannot sufficiently challenge the initially held beliefs when no adequate, novel 
explanations about the underlying causal mechanism is offered simultaneously. In a study involving sixth- 
and ninth- graders as well as college students, Koslowski (1996) presented participants with the results of a 
fictitious study that investigated whether two kinds of food (sweets with low or high concentration of sugar, 
and milk with low or high concentration of fat) influenced whether or not children could easily fall asleep. 
All participants initially believed that sugar but not fat had a significant influence on children’s ability to find 
sleep. Participants were assigned to two conditions: In one condition, participants received only covariation 
evidence that contradicted their initially held belief (“covariation-only-condition”); in the other condition, 
participants received not only covariation evidence, but also they were given an explanation concerning the 
mechanism that may link fat to sleep (“covariation-and-mechanism condition”). As hypothesized, receiving 
an additional explanation led to significant more belief revision than did the covariation-evidence alone.  
The explanation condition that was included in the present study therefore presented, analogously to 
Koslowski (1996), children with an explanation that accounted for the occurrence of the counterevidence and 
a mechanism that linked the two variables. The diagram condition in turn, presented empirical data about 
covariation in a salient way, depicted in bar graphs. Participants were preschool and primary-school children, 
who are at an age when conceptual change occurs over a wide range of knowledge areas. We hypothesized 
that children in this young age group would change their prior belief when presented with evidence in a 
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salient way. In addition, we hypothesized that belief revision would, in the diagram condition, not be inferior 
to belief revision in the explanation condition.  
 
2. Methods 
A 2 (condition: explanation vs. diagram) by 2 (age group: preschoolers vs. second-graders) between-
subjects design was employed to investigate children’s belief revision in four tasks. 
2.1.  Participants 
Participants were 134 children, among them 54 preschoolers (M = 5,6 years, SD = 5 months, 
nexplanation = 28, ndiagram = 26) and 80 second-graders (M = 7,6 years, SD = 5 months, nexplanation = 40, ndiagram = 
40). The 64 girls and 70 boys were sampled from 10 middle-class preschools and schools in a proximity to a 
large city in southern Germany. Preschools and schools supplied parents with information material about the 
study, and parents decided whether or not their children would be allowed to participate in the study. In 
addition to parental informed consent, child assent was obtained for all participants. Participants from both 
age groups were semi-randomly assigned to one of the two conditions to ensure equal group sizes. 
2.2.  Material and Procedure 
Four tasks were used to test children’s belief revision. The contexts used in these tasks were contexts 
in which children typically hold strong, naïve beliefs about the covariation and causal relation between two 
variables. These were: (1) Eating carrots (but not spinach) improves vision; (2) drinking milk (but not 
mineral water) increases bone density; (3) eating gummi bears (but not mustard) makes you fat; and (4) 
eating chocolate (but not bananas) makes you happy. For each context, the children were first asked about 
their initial belief concerning the relation between the variables (e.g. “Does eating carrots or eating spinach 
improve vision, or do they both equally contribute to good vision?”). Children’s answers were visually 
displayed by placing small plastic cards (e.g., eyes and carrots) in front of them. This was done so that 
children would remember their initial belief. Also, children indicated how confident they were about their 
initial belief (0, 1, 2).  
In addition, children were presented with a story protagonist (Robbie or Anna, depending on the 
gender of the child which was the same for the protagonist) who held the same initial belief as the child. This 
was done in order to account for potential differences between children’s own belief revision and the 
revision they ascribe to another person. 
Depending on children’s initial belief, the following counterevidence was used to induce belief 
revision in children: In the carrot/spinach context (task 1), children who believed that carrots or spinach 
improved vision were presented with counterevidence that showed that the effect of the two variables is 
equally strong (noncovariation). Children who initially believed that both factors are equally associated with 
good vision were presented with counterevidence that showed that carrots improve vision (see Table 1 for an 
overview of which counterevidence was presented in response to varying initial beliefs). Because the prior 
literature revealed that the type of covariation evidence (e.g., perfect covariation or noncovariation) 
influences preschoolers’ interpretation of data (e.g., Koerber et al., 2005, Piekny & Mähler, 2013), we 
included counterevidence in the form of noncovariation as well as in the form of perfect covariation in order 
to account for potential effects.  
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Table 1 
Design of the four tasks 
 
Context Child said Counterevidence 
(Factor A) 
Counterevidence 
(Factor B) 
Counterevidence 
(A/B same effect) 
Carrot/Spinach (task 1) Carrot (A)   x 
 Spinach (B)   x 
 Doesn’t matter 
(A/B) 
x   
Milk/Water (task 2) Milk (A)  x  
 Water (B) x   
 Doesn’t matter 
(A/B) 
 x  
Gummi bears/Mustard (task 3) Gummi bears (A)   x 
 Mustard (B)   x 
 Doesn’t matter 
(A/B) 
x   
Chocolate/Bananas (task 4) Chocolate (A)  x  
 Bananas (B) x   
 Doesn’t matter 
(A/B) 
 x  
In the diagram condition, counterevidence was presented visually in bar graphs (for an example, see 
Figure 1); in the explanation condition, experimenters presented the children with an explanation about a 
mechanism that supported the opposite of children’s initial belief. In the carrots/spinach context, for 
instance, children who initially believed that only carrots would improve vision heard an explanation that 
maintained that spinach and carrots contain equal amounts of vitamin A, which is the mechanism that 
improves vision. 
After the evidence was presented, experimenters reminded children of their initial belief. 
Subsequently, they asked the children about their present belief (including the strength of their confidence in 
this belief) as well as about the present belief of the story protagonist (third person). Children were 
interviewed individually by two research assistants, who were extensively trained and who each interviewed 
equal amounts of children in each condition and age group (i.e., there was no interaction between 
experimenters and condition). To ensure that children in the diagram condition were able to interpret the bar 
graphs, a short introduction was given in which the experimenters explained how to read a bar graph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a bar graph (perfect covariation). 
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3. Results 
Preanalyses revealed that children’s confidence in their initial belief [low (=0), moderate (=1) or 
high (=2)] was high before treatment (M = 1.59; SD =.44 and M = 1.63, SD = .38, respectively, for the 
preschoolers and second-graders) with no significant difference between the age groups, t(132) =-.547, 
p>.05. This clearly indicates that all children held strong initial beliefs.  
Figure 2 shows the mean percent of belief revision across all four tasks.  In line with our hypothesis, 
more than 60% of all children changed their initial belief in light of the salient evidence or the explanations. 
In the explanation condition, between 63% and 71% of all children changed their initial belief (solid lines) 
and they ascribed a belief revision to the story protagonist (dashed lines) in the light of the counterevidence. 
In the diagram condition, belief revision was more pronounced in both measures for the second-graders 
(84% and 86%) than for the preschoolers (59% and 67%). The difference between the diagram condition and 
the explanation condition was significant in second grade, where children significantly more often changed 
their own initial belief, t(78)=2.68, p <.01, and significantly more often ascribed a belief revision to the story 
protagonist, t(78) = 3.44, p=.001, in the diagram condition than in the explanation condition. In the diagram 
condition, there was, in addition, a significant difference between the two age groups, with five-year-olds 
changing their initial belief significantly less often than eight-year-olds, t(64) =-4.67, p<.001, and also they 
ascribed significantly less often a belief revision to the story protagonist than did eight-year-olds, t(64) =–
2.63, p=.01.  While a 2 (age) by 2 (condition) analysis of variance of children’s mean number of belief 
revisions ascribed to the story protagonist revealed  no significant main effects for age (F(1, 129) = 1.282, 
ns) or condition (F(1, 129) = 2.590, ns) a significant interaction, F(1, 129) = 5.631, p < .05, η2 = .042 was 
revealed. 
 
Figure 2. Mean number of belief revisions categorized by age and condition  
 
4. Discussion 
Can successful belief revision be induced in young children when evidence is presented in a salient 
way? The present study found that salient evidence (diagrams) is as effective to challenge and revise young 
children’s initial beliefs as explanations. In contrast to the findings of a large number of prior studies (e.g., 
Amsel & Brock, 1996; Chinn & Brewer, 1993), our findings suggest that even preschoolers are able to revise 
an initial belief when they are presented with counterevidence, be it an explanation about a mechanism or 
covariation evidence in a salient way. Second-graders showed even more belief revision when presented 
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with salient counterevidence (bar graph) than when receiving an explanation, suggesting that this form of 
evidence presentation may be especially beneficial in this age group.  
In accordance with our hypothesis, bar graphs helped children to successfully interpret the data and 
to revise their initial beliefs. Bar graphs appear to be such a helpful tool in belief revision because they depict 
the relation between two or more variables in a straightforward manner; in addition, they enable students to 
grasp complex data patterns that depict the relations between multiple variables at a single glance, and they 
help to reduce memory and information processing demands. This way, bar graphs make the 
counterevidence more salient, and by means of this saliency they lead to substantially higher rates of belief 
revision than have been found in prior studies (e.g., Amsel & Brock, 1996). 
Interestingly, our second graders performed even better in the diagram condition than in the 
explanation condition. This is an interesting finding because research from Koslowski (1996) has shown 
highly beneficial effects of explanations in belief revision. A possible explanation for this finding (the high 
amount of belief revision in the diagram condition) is that children may have come up with self-generated 
explanations (Legare, 2012). These self-generated explanations may have supported and strengthened the 
effect of the diagrams. Legare showed that two- to six-year-olds produce substantially more often self-
generated explanations when they are faced with counterevidence than when they interpret evidence that is 
consistent with their initial beliefs.  
Importantly, our participants did not seem to distort the data in the diagram condition. This is most 
likely due to the salience of the counterevidence that we presented in the bar graphs, which makes it difficult 
to ignore or neglect aspects of the data that do not align with children’s initial beliefs. Visually perceiving 
counterevidence thus might have triggered children to generate their own, new explanations for the 
unexpected relation rather than distorting the data. And it is reasonable to assume that these self-generated 
explanations are even more beneficial for inducing belief revision than those generated by another person.  
Given this interpretation, it might be that the better performance of the second graders in the diagram 
condition cannot only be attributed to their perception of the visual information but also to their deeper 
processing of the information. Future studies therefore need to disentangle the impact of the visual salience 
of the counterevidence and the depth of processing of the information (e.g., the generation of self-
explanations). To this end, “thinking aloud” protocols in which participants are explicitly asked to come up 
with explanations may be especially helpful. If the salient presentation of evidence and diagrams indeed 
provoke self-generated explanations, then it is impossible to strictly isolate the effects of the presentation of 
the diagram and the explanations. Thus, in line with Koslowski (1996, 2012), we did not regard evidence and 
explanation as a dichotomy, but rather we suggest that future studies should investigate the way in which the 
salient presentation of evidences leads to the generation of theory-based explanations. Adding a third, mixed 
condition, in which the participants receive counterevidence and explanations, should then be equally 
facilitating for belief revision as the diagrams alone.  
Children’s own belief revision was contrasted in this study with their ascription of belief revision to 
another person. Although we found convergent findings in these two measures, the difference between the 
diagram and the explanation condition was more pronounced in second grade when asking children about 
another person’s belief revision. The belief revision of a third person has been the dependent measure in 
many other studies (e.g., Koerber et al, 2005; Piekny & Mähler, 2013), which is typically done because it 
ensures that the (counter)evidence is evaluated from a more abstract and distant level.  The general trends in 
our data were however similar for our two measures (own belief revision and belief revision ascribed to a 
third person) so that it seems reasonable to assume that these two measures are closely related, leading to the 
same conclusions regarding the influence of saliency on evidence interpretation.  
In sum, our findings suggest that the salient presentation of counterevidence leads to belief revision 
in children as young as five-year-olds. Although explanations are important for children’s belief revision, 
explanations do not need to be provided externally (e.g., by an adult); instead, our data show that presenting 
evidence may suffice when it is presented in a way that is salient and that may elicit children’s self-
generation of explanations. If this interpretation of our findings holds and children indeed generate 
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explanations while processing salient evidence, this finding will be of high relevance not only for theorists, 
but also for teachers and practitioners in schools. First, it underlines the important role diagrams can play for 
illustrating concepts. Second, it also reveals their usefulness for eliciting and promoting conceptual change 
(see also Koerber, 2003). Therefore, diagrams should play a more important role in school in general and 
specifically in science and math curricula.  
Keypoints 
 Preschoolers are able to revise a prior belief when presented with counterevidence 
 Perceptual saliency of evidence (given in a diagram) helps children to evaluate hypotheses and 
revise beliefs 
 The role of evidence and explanations for supporting hypothesis evaluation should not be viewed 
as dichotomous. 
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